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Comments
THE "OFFICIAL ENGLISH" MOVEMENT
AND THE DEMISE OF DIVERSITY: The
Elimination of Federal Judicial and Statutory
Minority Language Rights
"The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who

speak other languages as well as to those born with
English on the tongue. "'

Although "official English" has been a topic of concern since the
founding of our country, for the first time in our nation's history there is

a real possibility that there will be little protection for minority language
rights.2 Unlike the early 1900s, when minority language rights were
primarily local and state issues,' the new "official English" movement has
taken on a national character with national implications.

Traditionally, federal statutes and the United States Constitution have
provided protection for minority language rights. Federal statutory
5 and VIP of the Civprotections include the Voting Rights Act, 4 Titles VV
il Rights Act, the Bilingual Education Act, 7 and the Equal Educational

1. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
2. For purposes of this comment, "minority language rights" means the right of an individual
to not be isolated from education, employment, or governmental participation because his/her primary
or native language is not English.
3. Jamie B. Draper & Martha Jimenez, Language Debates in the United States, in THE REFERENCE SHELF: ENGLISH : OUR OFFICIAL LANGUAGE? 10, 10 (Bee Gallegos ed., 1994).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994) (§ 1973aa-la requires bilingual voting assistance in certain situations).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) (prohibits exclusion in federally assisted programs on the basis
of national origin).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) (prohibits discrimination in the workplace on the basis of national origin).
7. 20 U.S.C. §§ 3281 et seq. (1994) (provides for bilingual education programs).
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Opportunities Act.' Constitutional safeguards include the First9 and Fourteenth"0 Amendments. An alarming trend indicates that the federal
statutory protections are being eroded by state and federal legislation.
Pending federal legislation" would repeal many, if not all, statutory
protections. In addition, the Supreme Court recently decided a Ninth
of the Arizona "official
Circuit case challenging the constitutionality
12
English" constitutional amendment.
This comment examines the history of language rights by identifying
the relationship between statutory enactments and the subsequent judicial
interpretations. Additionally, this comment illustrates the face of the current "official English" movement by reviewing state "official English"
statutes, pending federal legislation, and Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona.' 3 This comment concludes by presenting a constitutional framework for analyzing "official English" statutes.
I. "OFFICIAL ENGLISH" MOVEMENTS: PAST AND PRESENT
A. HistoricalBackground
Language diversity has been an issue since before the American
Revolution. 4 In 1753, Benjamin Franklin expressed fears about the
need for interpreters in Pennsylvania because of the large numbers of
German settlers. 5 Franklin also complained about German schools,
German newspapers, and German street signs.' 6 However, the United
States never declared an official language. The Continental Congress
made a conscious decision to protect multiligualism by not declaring
English the official language, but rather issued many significant docu-

8.

20 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. (1994) (§ 1703 prohibits the denial of equal educational op-

portunity on the basis of national origin; an educational agency is required to overcome language
barriers).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.

I0. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 62-66.
12. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 65 U.S.L.W. 4169 (1997), sub nom. Yniguez

v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), sub noma.Yniguez v.
Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990).
13. Id.
14. James C. Stalker, Official English or English Only, in THE REFERENCE SHELF 44, 44-52
(Bee Gallegos ed., 1994).

15. Id. at 46-47.
16. JAMES CRAWFORD, HOLD YOUR TONGUE 37 (1992) ("Why should the Palatine Boors be
suffered to swarm into our Settlements, and by herding together, establish their Language and Manners to the exclusion of ours? Why should Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a Colony of
Aliens... ?" (quoting Benjamin Franklin, 1775) (emphasis in original)).
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ments, including the Articles of Confederation, in German and
French. 7 Nevertheless, the tradition of multilingualism in America has
never been sure nor consistent.
After the Civil War, with the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal government was viewed as the protector of individual
rights.'" However, language rights were not necessarily considered an
individual right worthy of federal protection. For example, in the 1880's,
the Indian Peace Commission concluded that language differences were
the main problem between Native Americans and the federal
government's policy of Manifest Destiny. 9 Additionally, an Englishproficiency requirement was enacted in 1897 to bar Italians and Slavs
from Pennsylvania's coal fields, and a congressional measure was approved in 1906 which denied citizenship to immigrants unable to speak
English.'o According to one study, after World War I, twenty-three states
enacted statutes restricting foreign language instruction, particularly German, in response to post-war anti-German sentiment.21 Unlike the current
"official English" movement, these examples seem to have targeted specific groups for particular purposes Y
Despite these acts against language minorities, since 1964, the
federal government has affirmatively protected minority language
rights.23 The following sections outline the federal government's activity in protecting minority language groups' access to government,
employment and education.

17. Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural
Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REv. 269, 285-86 (1992).
18. Id. at 309. The Civil War was fought, in part, over state governments' violations of individual rights. As part of the Reconstruction, the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted which, for the
first time, applied the Bill of Rights (including due process and equal protection of the laws) to state
governments. States would no longer be entrusted as the protector of individual rights, a marked
changed from the Revolution where the federal government could not be trusted. Id.
19. CRAWFORD, supra note 16, at 43-44 ("Through sameness of language is produced sameness of sentiment, and thought; customs and habits, . . . their barbarous dialects should be blotted out
and the English language substituted." (quoting the Indian Peace Commission of 1868)).
20. See id. at 28-53.
21. Leila Sadat Wexler, OfficialEnglish, Nationalismand Linguistic Terror:A French Lesson,
71 WASH. L. REV. 285, 340 (1996).
22. CRAWFORD, supra note 16, at 3. Explanations for the xenophobic nature of the current
official English movement include racism toward the demographic changes of the immigrants and
mass communications increasing the perceived threat of these immigrants. The source countries have
changed since Congress abolished the national origin quota system in 1965. The new immigrants from
Southeast Asia and Latin America are less familiar racially, culturally and linguistically. Minority
tongues are suddenly more visible and dissonant. Wexler, supra note 21, at 353.
23. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 illustrates the inclusion of minority language rights in the
civil rights movement of the 1960's and 1970's. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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1. Access to Government
Access to governmentu is partially protected by the Voting Rights Act
of 1965.21 In 1975, amendments to the Voting Rights Act added bilingual
election requirements.26 The bilingual election provisions require assistance in
languages other than English if: (1) a single minority group comprises over
five percent of voting age citizens; and (2) the jurisdiction or state illiteracy
rate exceeds the national rate. 2 ' These amendments were intended to protect

against state or local unilingual ballots' because strong evidence indicated that
English-only elections excluded minority citizens from participation in elections. 29 Studies indicate that the bilingual ballot provisions have been successful; bilingual ballots have affected voter participation to such an extent that
election results have been directly impacted.'
2. Employment
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"' to prohibit
employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national
origin. "Employment" includes hiring, firing, payment of wages and other
terms and conditions of employment. Employers bound by Title VII include
state and local governments, agencies, and any employers or labor organizations comprised of fifteen or more employees or members of industries affecting commerce.32 To enforce the guarantees contained in Title VII, Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 3

24. For purposes of this comment, "access to government" is defined as the ability to participate in any level of the political process.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-la (Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 to 406 (1975)). This section
was extended through 1992 (Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 to 135 (1982)) and through August 6,
2007 (Pub. L. No. 102-344, 106 Stat. 291 (1992)).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-la (1994).
28. Frank M. Lowery, IV, Comment, Through the Looking Glass: Linguistic Separatismand
National Unity, 41 EMoRY L.J. 223, 297 (1992).

29. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(a) (1994) ("Congress finds that, through the use of various practices and procedures, citizens of language minorities have been effectively excluded from participation
in the electoral process. Among other factors, the denial of the right to vote of such minority group
citizens is ordinarily directly related to the unequal educational opportunties afforded them, resulting
in high illiteracy and low voting participation.").
30.

Antonio J. Califa, Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken Here, 24

HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 293, 306-07 (1989).
31. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Star. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1994)).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
33. David T. Wiley, Whose Proof?.: Deference to EEOC Guidelines on DisparateImpact DiscriminationAnalysis of "English-Only" Rules, 29 GA. L. REV. 539, 544-45 (1995).
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The EEOC's failure to immediately issue guidelines for evaluating
rules regulating language choice proved problematic for courts wanting
some guidance. In Garcia v. Gloor, the Fifth Circuit implicitly requested
EEOC guidance. 34 In response, the EEOC promulgated the "Guidelines
Origin," which directly address
on Discrimination Because of National
3 s
English-only rules in the workplace .
The EEOC guidelines presume workplace English-only rules discriminate on the basis of national origin because:
A rule requiring employees to speak only English at all times in
the workplace is a burdensome term and condition of employment. The primary language of an individual is often an
essential national origin characteristic. Prohibiting employees at
all times, in the workplace, from speaking their primary language
or the language they speak most comfortably, disadvantages an
individual's employment opportunities on the basis of national
origin. It may also create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation
and intimidation based on national origin which would result in a
discriminatory working environment. 36
An employer may rebut the presumption of discrimination by demonstrating a business necessity for an English-only rule. 7
3. Bilingual Education
In 1968, Congress passed the Bilingual Education Act,38 which
targeted the special educational needs of non-English speaking students. 39 The Act provided grants to school districts which implemented programs aimed at increasing English proficiency. The Bilingual
Education Act encouraged language assistance but allowed school

34. 618 F.2d 264, 268 & n.l (5th Cir. 1980) ("While the EEOC has considered in specific

instances whether a policy prohibiting the speaking of Spanish in normal interoffice contacts discriminates on the basis of national origin, it has adopted neither a regulation stating a standard for testing
such language rules nor any general policy, presumed to be derived from the statute prohibiting them.
We therefore approach the problem on the basis of the statute itself and the case law.").
35. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7.
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a).
37. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b).
38. Pub. L. No. 90-247, 81 Stat. 783, 816 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3221-61
(1988)). For a discussion of the subsequent amendments to and reauthorizations of the Bilingual
Education Act, see Rachel F. Moran, The Politics of Discretion: Federal Intervention of Bilingual
Education, 76 CAL. L. REv. 1249, 1272-1314 (1988).
39. Michelle Arington, Note, English-Only Laws and Direct Legislation: The Battle in the
States Over Language Minority Rights, 7 J.L. & POL. 325, 333 (1991).
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districts to retain discretion in developing bilingual programs and in
applying for funds."
Since the Act did not require districts to provide bilingual education
or to submit grant applications, bilingual education remained a local
curriculum decision.4 The Act did not impose direct mandates on local
school districts. In fact, congressional appropriations between 1969 and
1973 always fell below authorized expenditure levels. 2 However, evidence indicates that the Act nonetheless indirectly improved state and
local bilingual education policy. 3 Prior to 1968 no state had enacted
bilingual educational provisions.' By 1973 at least six states had created
such provisions while a number of other states repealed statutes making
English the exclusive language of instruction.4
In 1970, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
determined that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 required schools
to provide special educational assistance to students not proficient in English.' HEW's interpretation of Title VI established that ignoring the needs
of non-English speaking students was a form of national origin discrimination.47 HEW issued an official memorandum mandating that school districts receiving federal funds rectify the language deficiencies of nonEnglish speaking students.'
In Lau v. Nichols,49 the United States Supreme Court unanimously
upheld HEW's interpretation of Title VI. The Court held that the San
Francisco school system's failure to provide English language instruction
denied a "meaningful opportunity" to participate in public education in
violation of Title VI.' The Court reasoned that exclusion based upon a
characteristic unique to a national origin minority group had the same
effect as an intentional scheme to exclude such a group from a realistic
chance to obtain an education." The Court declared:"[There is no equali-

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. In 1968 Congress did not appropriate any funds under the Act, although $15 million had
been authorized. Between 1969 and 1973 annual funding never exceeded $35 million even though up
to $135 million had been authorized. Moran, supra note 38, at 1264-65.
43. Id. at 1265.
44. Id.
45. These states included minois, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. Id.
46. 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1970) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 80 (1970)); see also, DENNIS BARON, THE ENGLISH-ONLY QUESTION 172 (1990).
47. 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595, supra note 46.
48. Id.
49. 414 U.S. 563 (1973).

50. Id. at 569.
51. Id. at 566.
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ty of treatment merely by providing students with the same facilities,
textbooks, teacher, and curriculum; for students who do not understand
52
English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education."
However, the Supreme Court did not prescribe the steps a school district
must take to remedy language deficiencies.
Congress codified Lau with the Equal Educational Opportunities Act
(EEOA) of 1974." Section 204 of the EEOA provides that:
No State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual
on account of his or her race, color, sex or national origin,
by ...

(f) the failure by an educational agency to take appropri-

ate action to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its students in the instructional programs.'
While state and local school districts maintain a great deal of discretion in
the area of bilingual education, federal statutes and case law impose an
affirmative obligation on schools to provide some special language instruction to those students who do not speak English.
B. The New "Official English" Movement
The newest "official English" movement began in the 1980's in state
legislatures, culminating in pending federal legislation. The following
sections present the face of this movement in terms of legislation and the
issues the new debate focuses on.
1. The "Official English" Movement In The States
Since the early 1980's, states have been passing "official English"
legislation, with the movement gaining momentum in the latter part of the
decade. In 1980, only two states had enacted legislation declaring English
the official language. Currently, twenty-two states have enacted such
legislation."
State statutes and constitutional amendments declaring English the
official language fall along a continuum. At one end are rather benign
legislation and amendments that simply declare English the official lan-

52. Id.
53. Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 515 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§1701-1758 (1982)).
54. Id. § 1701(0.

55. Wyoming passed an "official English" statute during the 1996 legislative session. 1996
Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 34 (codified at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 8-6-101 (Michie 1997)).
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guage.5 6 At the other end of the continuum are legislation and amend-

ments, including the Wyoming statute, composed of more restrictive
provisions.57 The Wyoming statute declares that except as otherwise provided by law, no state agency or political subdivision of the state shall be
required to provide any documents, information, literature or other written materials in any language other than English. The statute also provides that a state agency may act in a language other than English under
eight exceptions."8

The most restrictive legislation enacted to date is the Arizona constitutional amendment, 9 discussed at length later in this comment. Other
56. See, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2.013 (Banks-Baldwin 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, para.
460/20 (Smith-Hurd 1991); IND. CODE ANN. 1-2-10-1 (West 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. 3-3-31
(1987); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 54-02-13 (1987): Arkansas declares English the official language and
specifically guarantees this statute does not prevent providing educational opportunities to all children.
ARK. CODE ANN. 1-4-117 (Michie 1987). English and Hawaiian are the official languages of Hawaii.
HAW. REV. STAT. CoNsr. ART. XV 4 (1978). The Montana Code provides that English is the official

and primary language of the state and local governments but specifically states that "this section is not
intended to violate the federal or state constitutional right to freedom of speech of government officers
and employees acting in the course and scope of their employment. This section does not prohibit a
government officer or employee acting in the course and scope of employment from using a language
other than English . . . " MT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-510 (1995).
57. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 8-6-101 (Michie 1997). See app. B. Two provisions direct the respective legislature to take all steps necessary to implement the new sections: Colorado and Florida.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. CONS'r. ART. H130a (West 1992). FLA. STAT. ANN. CONsr. ART. I § 9
(West 1988).
Georgia provides an almost schizophrenic approach to official language. One part provides
that English "shall be the language used for each public record... and each public meeting... and
for official Acts of the State of Georgia, including those governmental documents, records, meetings,
actions, or policies...

. " GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-100 (1981). However, a later provision provides

that "state agencies, counties, municipal corporations, and political subdivisions of this state are
authorized to use or to print official documents and forms in languages other than [English], at the
discretion of their governing authorities ... (as long as an English translation is provided)." Id.
Virginia's legislation provides that no state agency or government is either required or prevented from providing documents, literature, and information in a language other than English. However, it also provides that "school boards shall have no obligation to teach the standard curriculum,
except those courses in foreign languages, in a language other than English." VA. CODE ANN. § 7.1 42 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-212.1 (1996). New Hampshire provides that English must be the
language for "all official public documents and records, and of all proceedings and nonpublic sessions." N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3-C:l (1995).
Tennessee's statute mandates that ballots and all other governmental publications and communications be conducted in English, including public insuuction. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 4-1-404
(1984). South Dakota provides the same restrictions but includes an exception for public health, safety
or emergency services. However, in order to trigger the exceptions, approval at an open public meeting is required. S.D. CODumED LAWS § 1-27-20 through § 1-27-22 (1995).
The South Carolina code provides that "neither the State nor any political subdivision thereof
shall require ... the use of any language other than English. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1-696 (1987);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1-697 (1987). The "exceptions" section only states that the official language
provision does not apply to education. Id.
58.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 8-6-101 (Michie 1997).

59. ARmz. CONST. ART. XXVIII (1988). See app. C.
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examples of legislation at the restrictive end of the continuum are Alabama and California which provide that English is the official language
and direct the legislature to take all steps to enhance and preserve the role
of English as the official language.' o It is unclear from this type of legislation how far legislatures will go to "preserve" the English language.
Another example of the most restrictive legislation is Nebraska's
Constitution, which provides not only that English is the state's official
language but also that "all official proceedings, records and publications
shall be in such language, and the common school branches shall be
taught in said language in public, private, denominational and parochial
schools. "61

2. The Federal "Official English" Movement
On August 1, 1996, the United States House passed House Bill 123,
the English Language Empowerment Act of 1996 (the ELEA).62 The Act
declared that English was the official language of the federal government,
mandated that the federal government conduct its business in English,
eliminated the federal bilingual ballot requirement, and required that
naturalization ceremonies be conducted in English.63 The Senate Judiciary
Committee did not act on the bill before the 104th Congress adjourned.
However, discussion of the bill is still helpful for purposes of this comment because the bills and resolutions presented in the 105th Congress are
very similar. 64
60. ALA. CODE CONST. AMEND. NO. 509 (1990); CAL. CODE. CONST. ART. I1 6 (West
1986).
61.

NEB. REV. STAT. CONST. ART. I § 27 (1920).

62. 142 CONG. REC. H9725-04. See app. A.
63. Id. at H9726.
64. The Bill Emerson English Language Empowerment Act of 1997 (the EELEA), H.R. 123,
105th Cong. (1997), is identical to the ELEA except this version does not specifically repeal the bilingual ballot mandate contained in the Voting Rights Act. 143 CONG. REC. E36-01 (daily ed. January 7, 1997)(statement of Rep. Cunningham). Rep. Doolittle proposed an amendment to the United
States Constitution that declares English the official language and requires that "the English language
shall be used for all public acts including every order, resolution, vote or election, and for all records
and judicial proceedings of the Government of the United states and the governments of the several
States". The resolution also gives Congress and state governments the power to enforce the article by
appropriate legislation. H.R.J. Res. 37, 105th Cong. (1997). The Declaration of Official Language
Act of 1997 (the DOLA) seems to parallel the ELEA most directly. Besides declaring English the
official language of the federal government, it requires that "communications by officers and employees of the Government of the United States with United States citizens" be in English. The DOLA
also requires that naturalization ceremonies be conducted entirely in English and repeals the bilingual
election requirements. Further, the DOLA "preempts any State or Federal law which is inconsistent."
H.R. 622, 105th Cong. (1997). The Language of Government Act of 1997 (the LGA) is the only
"official English" legislation currently pending in the Senate. The LGA seems to be the least imposing of the current federal proposals. While it requires official business be conducted in English, the
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If enacted, the effect of the ELEA and similar legislation is twofold.
First, the ELEA and similar legislation would supersede any existing
federal law contrary to its provisions. This could effectively repeal the
minority language protections contained in Titles VI and VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1975, the Equal Educational
Opportunities Act, the Bilingual Education Act, and any other language
provision included in federal legislation.'a Second, the ELEA and similar
legislation would remove the supremacy of federal legislation in providing
minority language right protections to citizens of the states. Without the
mandates contained in existing federal legislation, state and local governments, as well as the private sector, would be free to restrict minority
language rights. The ELEA and similar legislation would not only erode
civil rights which were recognized during the sixties and seventies, it
would create an unprecedented view of a unilingual nation that has never
been a part of the American tradition.'
LGA does allow use of other languages in nonofficial capacities. The LGA places an affirmative obligation on the federal government to preserve and enhance the role of English. S. 323, 105th Cong.
(1997). The text of the most recent proposal is unavailable at publication. H.R. 1005, 105th Cong.
(1997).
65. Other laws potentially affected include: Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1277(d)
(1982); federally-funded community and migrant health care centers, 42 U.S.C. § 254b(t)(3)(j)-254c
(1982); and federally-funded alcohol treatment and abuse programs, 42 U.S.C. § 4577(b) (1982). See
supra text accompanying note 64 (the Doolittle Amendment and DOLA specifically repeal the bilingual election requirements contained in the Voting Rights Act); § 166 of the ELEA ("[t]hat except as
otherwise provided in this chapter, the provisions of this chapter shall supersede any existing Federal
law that contravenes such provisions").
66. BARON, supra note 46, at 65-67; Amicus Brief in Support of Respondents at 24-25,
Yniguez (No. 95-974)('Although members of the Continental Congress recognized some of the same
concerns raised by Petitioners today about the use of non-English languages, no attempt was made to
prohibit non-English speech in the new nation. For example, during the Continental Congress, Benjamin Franklin expressed concern that the large German population would increasingly undermine
Anglican dominance in Pennsylvania and he publicly complained of the increasing German influence
in American society. Despite his concerns, Franklin did not attempt to limit the use of German in the
new United States-by government or by the people-but instead published himself the first German
newspaper in the United States.... In fact, Franklin opposed a proposal that would limit the printing
and sale of German materials."); see also, Perea, supra note 17, at 274.
Representative Serrano submitted a resolution to the House of Representatives in opposition
to the federal 'official English" proposals. Serrano's resolution is entitled the "English Plus Resolution" and states that "'English-only' measures .... would violate traditions of cultural pluralism,
divide communities along ethnic lines, jeopardize the provision of law enforcement, public health,
education, and other vital services to those whose English is limited, impair government efficiency,
and undercut the national interest by hindering the development of language skills needed to enhance
international competitiveness and conduct diplomacy." The resolution goes on to state that "official
English" measures "would represent an unwarranted Federal regulation of self-expression, abrogate
constitutional rights to freedom of expression and equal protection of laws, violate international human rights treaties to which the United States is a signatory, and contradict the spirit of the 1923
Supreme Court case Meyer v. Nebraska." The resolution concludes by encouraging the federal government to pursue policies of inclusion, multilingualism and diversity, and continue to provide services in languages other than English. H.R. Con. Res. 4, 105th Congress (1997).
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3. The Policy Debate
In order to survive constitutional challenges language restrictions
must serve, at a minimum, legitimate government interests. Proponents of
the "official English" movement offer several policy justifications for language restrictions. These justifications include national unity, economic
benefits, and greater political and social participation.
A. National Unity and National Identity
Proponents of "official English" argue that English is the "glue" that
holds the nation together.67 National unity is the main justification supporters use for enacting "official English" legislation:
[G]overnment has substantial interests in protecting itself and
society from the divisive effects of official multilingualism. A
common language promotes the maintenance of our pluralistic
democracy: if language and cultural separatism rise above a
certain level, the unity and political stability of the nation will
-

in time -

be seriously diminished . .

.

.This unity comes

from a common language and a core public culture of certain
shared values, beliefs, and customs which make us distinctly
'Americans. '68

Proponents argue that the very diversity that America celebrates requires
a common language in order to maintain commonality. They argue that
declaring an official language is an "insurance policy" against future
social disorder and conflict based on linguistic differences.'
The national unity argument fails for several reasons. First, there
is no historical basis for tying national unity to a common language.
None of the thirteen colonies found it necessary to declare English the
official language, even though there was no public school system to
teach English and little mobility to bring together isolated groups of
immigrants.7" Furthermore, linguistic differences have had nothing to
do with some of the bloodiest human conflicts, for example, the

67. 142 CONG. REC. H9725-04, H9730 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Roth).
68. Brief for Petitioners at 36-37, Yniguez (No. 95-974) (1996 WL 272394).

69. CRAwFORD, supra note 16, at 234. "Official English" proponents often cite Canada's language strife as an example for why the U.S. needs an official language policy. However, it does not
follow that because Canadians are fighting over language, language must be responsible. Id.

70. Brief of Amici Curiae Linguistic Society of America and National Council For Languages
and International Studies at 10, Yniguez (No. 95-974)(1996 WL 413764).
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American Civil War, World War II, and most recently, civil unrest in
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 7
Additionally, even though the United States has always been a multilingual and multicultural nation, 72 there is no evidence that English is any
less prevalent now than ever before.73
There is no serious movement to make any non-English language
the official language .... In fact, quite the opposite is true. Non-

English speaking immigrants are shifting to English at an historically rapid pace.74
English has always been the defacto official language of the United States.
Even without restrictive legislation, minority languages have always been
peripheral in American society.75 Studies indicate that a greater percentage
of Americans speak English than ever before, and non-English or bilingual speakers continued to learn English as quickly as earlier immigrants.76 And finally, there is no dispute that English is the international
language of commerce, science and affairs between nations.'
B. Economic Benefits
The second justification for "official English" enactments is economic benefits." Proponents argue that providing governmental services in
languages other than English costs state and local governments billions of
dollars.79 However, proponents are hard pressed to provide data showing
the actual costs involved in providing bilingual services. In its report to
the House Committee on Rules considering the English Language Empowerment Act of 1996, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported:
71.

Id. at 14-15.

72. See Dennis Baron, English in MulticulturalAmerica, in THE REFERENCE SHELF 79, 78-87
(Bee Gallegos ed.,1994.)

73. Perea, supra note 16, at 347 (94 to 96 percent of the American population speak English;
85 percent claim English as their native tongue) (citing Joshua A. Fishman, "English Only": Ghosts,
Myths, and Dangers, 74 INT'L J. SOC. LANGUAGE 125, 129 (1988)).
74. Brief for Respondent Maria-Kelly F. Yniguez at 41 (No. 95-974)(1996 WL 426410).
75. Baron, supra note 71, at 87.
76. Id. at 79.
77. Perea, supra note 17, at 347.
78. The author of Wyoming's legislation, Nimi McConigley, states that the legislation was

enacted primarily as a measure to protect state resources. Telephone Interview with Nimi McConigley
Republican Representative to State
House (Sept. 5, 1996). McConigley argues that the legislation is
simply intended to save costs associated with providing information in languages other than English
and to preempt possible lawsuits based on the availability of that information. According to
McConigley, the people of Wyoming speak close to 60 different languages. Id.
79. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 5. Yniguez (No. 95-974) (1996 WL 491444).
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"We found that no single, comprehensive data source existed within the
federal government that could identify and quantify the total number of
foreign language publications and documents issued both internally and
externally by federal government agencies and organizations."' The GAO
did find two data sources which indicated that less than one percent of
federal documents were published in foreign languages."' Additionally,
correspondence to the committee from the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO)indicated that the impact of the English Language Empowerment
Act of 1996 on the federal budget would be minimal.' While the CBO
it
expected that the bill would have little effect on the federal8 government,
3
would impose direct compliance cost on the private sector.
Proponents argue that "official English" does not divide citizens
along linguistic lines but rather opens opportunities to those who do not
speak English.' They argue that English is the key to attaining the American dream because when persons are less than proficient in English, they
are relegated to lower-paying jobs.A5 While the economic realities of this
argument are correct, there is no evidence to suggest that "official English" legislation creates more incentives to learn English than those already created by the marketplace.A6 There is a direct correlation between
the ability to speak English and higher income levels.' Generally, immigrants are well aware of the advantages of acquiring English.' In other
words, it is the economic realities of the marketplace which creates the
incentive to learn English, not government compulsion.

80. H. R. Rep. 734, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 1996 (WL 440272 (Leg. Hist.)).
81. Id. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that administrative convenience
will almost never be a sufficient justification for discrimination. C. Wengler v. Druggist's Mutual
Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (sex-based classification for presumed dependency for payment of
worker's compensation death benefits unconstitutional); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 58 (1981)

(Court upheld male-only draft registration as military necessity, but dissent pointed out that administrative inconvenience was not enough to justify sex discrimination).
82. H.R. Rep. 734, supra note 80. For example, less printing could reduce some costs, while
oral translation could increase other costs. The net change in costs would depend on how agencies
interpret the bill's exemptions.
83. Id.

84. In support of the Wyoming legislation McConigley indicates that the legislation is intended
to provide an incentive to immigrants to learn English so that they are provided a "level playing
field" in job opportunities and in participation in the American culture and democratic process. Telephone Interview with Nimi McConigley, supra note 76. MeConigley, who is an immigrant from
India, argues that attacks on the legislation as anti-immigrant or racist are unfounded. She argues that
language is simply a means to communicate and should not create an emotional threat.
85. 142 CONG. REC. H9725-04-H9730 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Solomon).
86. Brief for Respondent Maria-Kelly F. Yniguez at 40 (No. 95-974) (1996 WL 426410);
Brief of Amici Curiae Linguistic Society of America and National Council for Languages and International Studies, Yniguez at 21-25 (No. 95-974) (1996 WL 413764); Lowery. supra note 28, at 318-19.

87. Brief for Respondent Maria-Kelly F. Yniguez, supra note 83, at 18.
88. Id. at 19.
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C. GreaterPolitical and Social Participation
Proponents of "official English" argue that a uniform governmental policy on language will provide incentives to learn English and thus
prevent immigrants from isolating themselves along linguistic lines.
Proponents correctly point out that populations divided by language
tend to segregate socioeconomically along the same lines, with elite
groups speaking one language and disadvantages classes speaking
another. 9 They argue that "official English" provisions encourage
non-English speakers to learn English because in order to deal with
government they must speak English.' ° Additionally, proponents argue
that such provisions are inclusive rather than exclusive because "official English" provisions "indirectly ease the integration of non-English
speakers into schools, the job market, the economy, and society." 9'
Finally, proponents claim that a healthy political life becomes impossible when an individual is unable to deliberate issues with a common
understanding and a common language.'
However, declaring English as the official language will not create
faster assimilation or greater participation in society. 3 "Social mobility is
the crucial factor," 9' because the desire to move up the social ladder fosters contact with English speakers and thus increases incentives to speak
the dominant language.' o Immigrants often trade their native language for
English as a more helpful means of gaining social acceptance, economic
mobility, political clout and other advantages.

89. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation, The Claremont Institute for the Study of States-

manship and Political Philosophy, 34 Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioners, Yniguez at 23-30 (No. 95-974) (1996 WL 28494).

90. Id. at 28.
91. Id. It is in this area that proponents erroneously attack bilingual education as "retarding"
rather than expediting the integration of Hispanic children into the English-speaking world.
92. Id. at 23.
93. Brief of Amici Curiae Linguistic Society of American and National council for Languages
and International Studies for Respondent, Yniguez at 7-8 (No. 95-974) (1996 WL 413764) ("By limiting communication between the government and its citizens, Article XXVIII can only serve to reduce
participation in voting and other forms of self-governance."); Brief for Respondent Maria-Kelly F.
Yniguez at 46 (No. 95-974) (1996 WL 426410). See also Perea, supra note 17, at 348 ("English-only
ballots create no meaningful incentive to learn English, particularly given the overwhelming social
and economic incentives to learn English. English-only ballots disenfranchise citizens who, for various reasons, have retained a language other than English. According to a 1982 study by the MexicanAmerican Legal Defense and Education Fund, seventy-two percent of monolingual Spanish-speaking
citizens would be less likely to vote without the language assistance the Voting Rights Act requires.")
(citing Califa, supra note 30, at 306.).
94. CRAWFORD, supra note 16, at 23.
95. Id.
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The replacement of native languages with English is best achieved
through bilingual education, not governmental compulsion.' Studies show
that children learn very little English in sink-or-swim classrooms.' Research suggests that there are no shortcuts to English proficiency; teaching English as quickly as possible fails to prepare students to compete on
equal terms." Bilingual education is clearly the best means for assimilation. In addition, there is no evidence that current language minorities are
failing to assimilate. A demographic report in 1988 showed that Hispanic

immigrants are approaching a two-generation shift to English dominance
as compared to a three-generation shift for previous immigrants.99 Additionally, the current educational system cannot keep up with the demand
for adult English classes."ro
However, English proficiency alone does not guarantee political or
social success.' "[T]he best way to bring non-English-speakers into the
'mainstream' is to involve them in the democratic process while they
learn English, not shut them out of it until they are fluent. " r°" Certain
minorities should not be shut out of the democratic process because of
their histories and current circumstances. Laws like the Voting Rights Act
are designed to overthrow tyrannies of the majority whereas "official
English" provisions are designed to do the opposite.
II.

JuDIcIAL LIMITATION OF MINORITY LANGUAGE RIGHTS
PROTECTIONS

The following sections discuss how courts are currently limiting the
language protections enacted in the 1960's and 1970's. Of particular note

is how the courts' limitations began with the onset of the new "official

96. Id. at 210.
97. Id. at 211. Interestingly, the new Ebonics movement adds additional support to this point.
A 1989 study found that Black English-speaking students who were taught for three months by teachers trained in the structure of Ebonics showed a nearly 60 percent reduction in the use of Ebonic
features in their standard English writing assignments. A control group taught with conventional
English used Ebonic elements more in writing assignments. Inanother study, students were divided
into three groups. One group was taught reading materials using Ebonics, one with standard English,
and one used transitional language with elements of both. At the end of four months, students using
Ebonies had gained 6.2 months in their reading skills, compared with only 1.6 months for those using
standard English-only materials. Kenneth Cole and James Tobin, Linguists come to CaliforniaSchool
District'sDefense, DEr. NEWS, Jan. 19, 1997, at Al.
98. CRAwFORD, supra note 16, at 231.
99. James Crawford, Official English Isn't As Good As It Sounds, in THE REFERENCE SHELF:
ENGLISH: OUR OFFICIAL LANGUAGE? 52, 56 (Bee Gallegos ed., 1994).
100. BARON, supra note 46, at 192.
101. Id. at 193.
102. Brief for Amici Curiae United States Congress at 19 (No. 95-974) (1996 WL 418711).
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English" movement. It is disconcerting to see the judiciary, as an "insulated branch" of the American government, react at the same time as
legislatures to the political climate.

A. Access to Government
Courts have consistently upheld the bilingual ballot provisions of the
Voting Rights Act.' However, courts have been unwilling to broadly
interpret the Act beyond the bilingual ballot provisions. Initiative petitions ' 4 are not included in the protections provided by the Voting Rights
Act.t0 5 Similarly, intentions to recall"° are considered too far removed
from the voting booth to fall within the scope of the Voting Rights Act.l°"

B. Employment
The Ninth Circuit was the first circuit to hear a workplace English-only
case after the EEOC promulgated guidelines. In Gutirrez v. County of Los
Angeles,"ns the employer required all employees to speak English during
working hours unless translating to non-English-speaking persons. The rule
did not apply when employees were on their breaks or lunch hours."° One
employee brought suit under Title VII, alleging race and national origin discrimination with respect to a term or condition of employment.1 0
The court cited the EEOC Guidelines and noted that English-only

rules directly affect an essential national origin characteristic, regardless

103. The right to vote as contained in the Voting Rights Acts has been interpreted broadly; it is
not merely the right to gain physical access to a voting booth but includes the right to an effective
vote. Arroyo v. Tucker. 372 F. Supp. 764, 767 (1974); see also U.S. v. Metro. Dade County, 815
F. Supp. 1475, 1478 (1993)("The purpose of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was and is to 'promote
practical implementation of the Fifteenth Amendment, and to ensure that no citizen's right to vote is
denied or abridged on account of race.'").
104. Voters who wish to amend a constitution, statute, or the like may initiate a petition and
circulate the petition to gather enough signatures to place the initiative on the ballot.
105. Delgado v. Smith, 861 F.2d 1489, 1493 (11th Cir. 1988)('the petition process was far too
removed from the voting booth"); Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603, 607 (10th Cir. 198g)("the 'electotal process' to which the minority language provisions of the Act apply does not commence under
Colorado law until the Secretary of State certifies the measure is qualified for placement upon the
ballot, and that signing of an initiated petition is not 'voting'").
106. Intentions to recall include the notice of an intention to recall a public official being published in a newspaper and the petitions subsequently circulated to place the intention on ballot.
Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 590 F. Supp 852, 853 (C.D.Cal. 1984).
107. Id. at 855 ("The Court cannot reasonably conclude that such conduct violates the Act when
it is merely the first step in a process which might ultimately lead to the holding of an election to
recall an elected official.").
108. 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988).
109. Id. at 1037.
110. Id. at 1036.
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of the ability to comply. Moreover, the court articulated a standard for
weighing the proffered business justification for the English-only rule:
mhe justification must be sufficiently compelling to override the
discriminatory impact created by the challenged rule. In addition,
the practice or rule must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve, and there must be available no acceptable less discriminatory alternative which would accomplish the
purpose as well."'
insufficient
The court discarded all the proffered business justifications as
2
to overcome the presumption against the English-only rule. "
The Gutirrez decision illustrates the idea that from the inception of
the civil rights legislation until the mid-eighties, the federal government,
agencies, and courts equated language restrictions with national origin
discrimination. However, in 1992, the Ninth Circuit abandoned the national origin protections they had earlier recognized in Title VII. In Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.,"3 the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the EEOC
Guidelines and adopted a balancing test utilized in a pre-Guidelines decision by the Fifth Circuit in Gloor."
The Ninth Circuit's express rejection of the EEOC Guidelines was a
surprising decision for several reasons. First, the court had utilized the
Guidelines just five years earlier in Gutirrez.115 Second, the court stated
that nothing in Title VII indicated that English-only rules should be presumed discriminatory."1 6 Third, and most importantly, the general rule is
that administrative interpretations by the enforcing agency are entitled to
great deference-a court must find compelling reasons to reject the administrative guidelines." 7 The Ninth Circuit's reasons for rejecting the EEOC
111. Id. at 1041-42 (citations omitted).
112. The rejected business justifications were: (1) the United States is an English-speaking
country, and California is an English-speaking state; (2) the prevention of turning the workplace into
a "Tower of Babel"; (3) the promotion of racial harmony; (4) the supervisors may not understand or
speak Spanish, thus hindering their supervisory control; and (5) the California Constitution declares
English the official language of California. Id. at 1042-44.
113. 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated as moot, 510 U.S. 1190 (1994)).
114. Id. at 1489-90.
115. Gtairrez, 838 F.2d at 1039. It should also be noted hat this was the first time the Ninth
Circuit did not cite EEOC guidelines with approval. Garcia. 13 F.3d at 299 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting)
(citing Fragrante v. City and County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 595 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1081 (1990) and Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1987)).
116. Garcia, 998 F.2d at 1490. The court rejected the adverse effects presented by the plaintiff.
Of particular interest is that the same adverse effects are noted in the EEOC Guidelines as the reasons
for the rebuttable presumption of discrimination. See 29 CFR § 1606.7.
117. Garcia, 13 F.3d at 299 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting) (citing EEOC v. Commercial Office
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Guidelines were hardly compelling. In Gloor, the Fifth Circuit adopted a
balancing test because the EEOC had not issued any guidelines for
workplace English-only rules."' The Ninth Circuit offered no explanation
for going back to a rule implemented only because the EEOC had yet to
offer guidance." 9

The Garcia court held that the plaintiffs did not present a prima
facie case of national origin discrimination. Most notably, the court rejected the three proffered adverse effects: (1) denial of the ability to
express cultural heritage on the job, (2) denial of a privilege of employment enjoyed only by English-only speakers, and (3) creating an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation. "2 The court rejected the
first two effects by holding that Title VII does not protect privileges and
that there cannot be a disparate impact if the employee can "readily comply" with the rule.12 ' The Court rejected the last effect by holding that
there was insufficient evidence presented in this specific case that the rule
created a hostile environment. '"
Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988)). See also Wiley, supra note 32, at 566-69 (citing Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975)).
118. Gloor, 618 F.2d at 268. The requirements for establishing a prima facie case are: "(1) the
existence of adverse effects of the policy; (2) that the impact of the policy is on terms, conditions, or
privileges or employment of the protected class; (3) that the adverse effects are significant; and (4)
the employee population in general is not affected by the policy to the same degree." Dan Cooperider
& Stephen Wiss, The Limits of Deference: The Ninth Circuit Rejects EEOC Guidelines on EnglishOnly Rules in the Workplace-Garcia v. Spun Steak, 25 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 119, 137 (1995)
(citing Garcia, 998 F.2d at 1486).
119. Garcia, 998 F.2d at 1489 ("We have been impressed by Judge Rubin's pre-Guidelines analysis
for the Fifth Circuit in [Gloor]."). Commentators are concerned with the rejection of the EEOC Guidelines
for the balancing test largely because this disparate impact analysis is unworkable in workplace English-only
cases because: (1) the policy is not facially neutral, as disparate impact analysis requires, because the policy
exclusively impacts national origin groups other than those whose primary language is English, and (2) the
statistical data required to demonstrate the disparate impact is nearly impossible to produce. Stephanie L.
Kralk, Civil Rights-The Scope of Ttle VI Protectionfor Employees Otallengig nglish-Only Rules-Garcia
v. Spun Steak Co., 67 TEMP. L. REV. 393, 395 and 413 (1994). See also Cooperider & Wiss, supra note
118, at 147 (citing Perea, supra note 17, at 289).
120. Garcia, 998 F.2d at 1486-87.
121. Id. at 1487. The dissenting justice stated the concern with an analysis that weighs the
"ability to comply":
[The majority] concluded that bilingual employees do not suffer significant adverse effects
from an English-only rule because they have the 'choice' of which language to employ,
and can thus 'readily comply' with the rule. This analysis demonstrates a remarkable
insensitivity to the facts and history of discrimination. Whether or not the employees can
readily comply with a discriminatory rule is by no means the measure of whether they
suffer significant adverse consequences. Some of the most objectionable discriminatory
rules are the least obtrusive in terms of one's ability to comply: being required to sit in the
back of the bus, for example; or being relegated during one's law school career to a portion of the classroom dedicated to one's exclusive use.
Garcia, 13 F.3d at 298 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting).
122. Garcia, 998 F.2d at 1488.
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The dissenting justice in Garcia stated:
Language is intimately tied to national origin and cultural identity:
its discriminatory suppression cannot be dismissed as an 'inconvenience to the affected employees. .

.

.English-only rules not only

symbolize a rejection of the excluded language and the culture it
but also a denial of that side of an individual's personembodies,
23
ality.1
This statement parallels the reasoning of the EEOC for creating the rebuttable presumption of discrimination in its guidelines. This may be an
isolated case; however, the Ninth Circuit opened the door for national
origin discrimination in the workplace-a door previously closed by Congress and the EEOC.
C. Education
Bilingual education remains a matter of local discretion. Current
bilingual education policy lacks judicial interpretation which defines what
a bilingual education must entail. In order to show that a particular bilingual educational policy is discriminatory, a challenger must show that
the policy has a discriminatory intent.
Although the EEOA and United States Supreme Court's decision in
Lau" 4 seem to establish protection for bilingual education, education has
never been held by the United States'Supreme Court to be a fundamental
right. 23 In Lau, the Supreme Court did not reach the constitutional question of whether the educational program violated the equal protection
clause. 23 The Court's decision to refrain from holding that education is a
fundamental right and the lack of suggested remedies for providing an
equal education indicated that the Court would not create specific minority language rights in education. 27
A task force appointed by the United States Office of Civil Rights
issued a report in 1975 indicating that the way to enforce the Supreme
Court's decision in Lau was to mandate bilingual programs." 3 The Office
123. Garcia, 13 F.3d at 298 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 38-54.
125. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, (noting that although education is

an important interest, it is not guaranteed by the Constitution); Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v.
Tempe Elementary School, 587 F.2d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[E]ducation, although not an important interest, is not guaranteed by the Constitution. Therefore, it is not a fundamental right.").
126. Lau, 414 U.S. at 566.
127. BARON, supra note 46, at 172.
128. CQ Researcher, Bilingual Education, in THE REFERENCE SHELF; ENGUSH: OUR OFFICIAL
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of Civil Rights reacted to the report by explaining that the so-called Lau
remedies were only guidelines, but added that the burden of proving the
acceptability of alternatives to bilingual programs rested on the school districts involved. 29
Although the EEOA requires school districts to "take appropriate
action to overcome language barriers," it does not define appropriate
action. 3 ' In addition, the EEOA does not provide criteria for a court to
evaluate whether or not a school district has taken such action. 3 ' In
Castaneda v. Pickard,' the Fifth Circuit articulated a three-part analysis
that some courts have been willing to follow.' The Castaneda guidelines
require that bilingual instruction programs must: (1) be based on educationally recognized theory, (2) provide the resources and trained personnel necessary to transfer theory into effective instructional practices, and
(3) must show measurable positive results within a reasonable amount of
time. " While the Castaneda court provided the guidelines that other
courts might use in evaluating bilingual education programs, it also stated
[c]ourts should not substitute their educational values and theories
for the educational and political decisions properly reserved to
local school districts and the expert knowledge of educators, since
they are ill equipped to do so."'35
Clearly, bilingual education remains a highly discretionary arena for local
school districts.
In addition to finding no specific remedies in the bilingual mandates,
some courts now require an element of intent to show that differential
impact is discriminatory. In Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., the
Seventh Circuit held that the EEOA permits the state to set up its own
bilingual education program and delegate to local school districts the
primary burden of implementing it.' 36 In addition, the Gomez court held
that Title VI, like the equal protection clause, is violated only by conduct

LANGUAGE? 98, 102-103 (Bee Gallegos eds., 1994).

129. Id.
130. 20 U.S.C. 1703(0 (1994).
131. Teresa P. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 724 F. Supp. 698, 712 (N.D.Cal. 1989).
132.

648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981).

133. See, Teresa P., 724 F. Supp. at 712 ("the clearest statement of the EEOA's appropriate
action requirement is set forth in Castaneda v. Pickard"): Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 811

F.2d 1030, 1041 (7th Cir. 1987) (the Castanedaguidelines need fine tuning, but nonetheless provide
a helpful analytic structure).
134. Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1009-10.
135. Teresa P., 724 F. Supp. at 713 (quoting Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1009).

136. 811 F.2d at 1040.
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"animated by intent" to discriminate and not by conduct which, although
"benignly motivated," has differential impact on persons of different
races.137 Although there are guarantees of a bilingual education, courts
continue to leave most discretion to local school districts which does not
guarantee an effective bilingual education.
III. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE "NEW OFFICIAL ENGLISH"

MOVEMENT.
The language rights debate has proceeded in several stages. Until the
twentieth century, neither federal nor state governments viewed language
rights as a legal issue, whether to restrict or protect. The twentieth century
has seen several waves of minority language rights movements. The post-

World War periods saw attempts to limit non-English languages taught in
schools but the courts tempered this movement. t ' The 1960's brought in a era
protective of minority language rights. The federal government and the courts
began affirmatively protecting minority language rights through civil rights

legislation. The 1980's and 1990's, however, have seen a reverse trend - a

137. Id.
138. In Meyer v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the United States Supreme Court reviewed
the constitutionality of a Nebraska law that prohibited the teaching of any language other than English
until students reached the eighth grade. The Nebraska Supreme Court had affirmed the conviction of
a teacher who taught Biblical stories in German. The United States Supreme Court struck down the
law as violating the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite the anti-German sentiment after World War I,
the Court stated that "[mlere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as
harmful. Heretofore it has been commonly looked upon as helpful and desirable." Id. at 400. Further,
the Court stated:
[Tihe state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental
rights which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those
who speak other languages as well as to those born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it
would be highly advantageous if all had a ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but
this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the Constitution.
Id. at 401.
The Court basically held that there as no reason for this restrictive law:
The desire of the Legislature to foster a homogeneous people with American ideals prepared readily to understand current discussions of civic matters is easy to appreciate. Unfortunate experiences during the late war and aversion toward every character of truculent
adversaries were certainly enough to quicken that aspiration. But the means adopted, we
think, exceed the lirmtations upon the power of the state and conflict with rights assured to
plaintiff in error... No emergency has arisen which renders knowledge by a child of
some language other than English so clearly harmful as to justify its inhibition with the
consequent infringement of rights long freely enjoyed. We are constrained to conclude that
the statute as applied is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the
competency of the state.
Id. at 402-403. For a further discussion of post-World War I anti-German sentiment, see Perea,
supra, note 17 at 329-332.
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trend toward the restriction of minority languages and the increased protection
of the English language. It is clear from the federal "official English" movement that many in Congress have no intention of tempering this movement
but instead have joined it. 39 The courts are the last step in a path leading to
the total erosion of minority language rights. The First and Fourteenth
Amendments are the tools courts may utilize in this final step. The following
sections discuss how the courts can use these provisions to prevent the "official English" movement from eliminating minority language rights.
A. The First Amendment
The First Amendment guarantees that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech... . "

To determine whether a law vio-

lates the First Amendment, a court must address two issues. The first is
whether the government can regulate what is being said. Second, the court
must determine if the manner of regulation violates the First Amendment.
Whether the government can regulate speech turns on two broad
categories of analysis for abridgment of speech. The first category is
restricting speech because of its content, i.e., the ideas or information
contained in it, or its general subject matter. The second category is
restricting speech to avoid an "evil" unconnected with the speech's content, but rather with the physical qualities of the communication. This is
usually referred to as expressive conduct or symbolic speech. "" The
"official English" question falls within both categories. It may be viewed
as a regulation on what the speaker is saying 42 or a regulation on how the
speaker chooses to voice his/her message.143
139. President Clinton stated that he would have vetoed the ELEA if it had passed the Senate.
Mike Doming, House Clears English-Only Measure After Emotional Debate, CHI. TIRIB., Aug. 2,
1996, at 3 (1996 WL 2695623). "The Clinton Administration has opposed the bill as objectionable,
unnecessary, inefficient, and divisive. The Administration observed that English is universally acknowledged as the common language of the United States, but stated that nationhood is not based on
language alone. Americans are also united by constitutional rights such as freedom of speech, representative democracy, respect for due process, and equal protection under the law, the Administration
states. The proposed legislation is contrary to each of these principles, the Administration contends."
The Week in Congress, Cong. Index (CCH) 72 (Bill Would Make English Official Language, Aug.
2,1996). His veto, although clearly a step in the right direction, is only a partial solution. There is
the possibility that Congress will override his veto on any of the "official English" proposals. Furthermore, his veto would guarantee that Titles VI and VII, the Voting Rights Act, the Equal Educational Opportunity Act and the Bilingual Education Act stay on the books, but this does not prevent
judicial erosion of the effectiveness of these statutes.
140. U.S. CONSI. amend. I.
141. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 792 (2nd Ed. 1988).

142. "Official English" proponents argue that speaking a language other than English may allow
the speaker to undermine a supervisor's authority, or other divisive conduct, without the listener or
supervisor knowing what is being said.
143. Proponents of the official English movement argue that choice of language "is a mode of
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Assuming that the government may regulate a specific type of
speech, the First Amendment also limits how the government can regulate
that speech. There are several limits on how speech can be restricted but
the overbreadth doctrine is the key issue for minority language restrictions. Under the overbreadth doctrine;
an individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited is
permitted to challenge a statute on its face 'because it also threatens others not before the court-those who desire to engage in
legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so
rather than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared
partially invalid."'
The overbreadth must be real and substantial. 5 The reason for the overbreadth doctrine is often called the chilling effect: "the statute itself will
significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of
parties not before the Court."" 4 Parties not before the court will selfcensor, even though their speech is constitutionally-protected. 47
Overbreadth relates strongly to the new "official English" movement
because many of the statutes contain broad language with narrow exceptions. For example, several statutes take away the option of speaking in
another language, even for such core First Amendment speech as communication between a constituent and his/her legislator, wedding ceremonies,
government employees commenting on matters of public concern, and
providing governmental entitlements and services.
B. The Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment prevents a government from denying
persons equal protection of the laws. " Courts use a three-tier system of
review when analyzing equal protection challenges. The highest level of
review, strict scrutiny, is reserved for suspect classifications, 49 usually

conduct-a nonverbal expressive activity," Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 934.
144. Board of Airport Comm'rs. of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S.
569, 575 (1987).
145. Id. See also, Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
146. Id.
147. For a discussion, see, Martina Stewart, English-Only Laws, Informational Interests, and
the Meaning of the First Amendment in a PluralisticSociety, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 539, 543544 (1996) ("[T]he overbreadth doctrine protects the rights of speakers who may fear challenging the
disputed regulation on their own.").
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
149. Suspect classifications are defined as classifications of discrete and insular minorities.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938). A minority is discrete and insular
when: (1) there has been a history of purposeful discrimination against the minority (City of Clebume
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race, ethnicity and national origin.'5 0 Governmental action at this level of
review must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental
interest.' Mid-level review, heightened scrutiny, is reserved for semisuspect classifications, usually gender and legitimacy." This level requires that governmental action be substantially related to an important
governmental interest.' The lowest level of review, rational basis, is
reserved for governmental action against a class of persons who are not a
suspect class.54 Rational basis review simply requires that the classification bear a rational relation to a legitimate governmental interest.'55 Strict
scrutiny usually results in the governmental action being struck
down,
5 6
while most governmental action survives rational basis review.
Classifications based on speaking a language other than English 57
have usually received rational basis review.' However, the Supreme
Court has never reviewed an "official English" rule for equal protection
violations."' There are two ways a court could invoke strict scrutiny to
review language classifications. First, language classifications could be
viewed by the courts as national origin discrimination or, second, language classifications could become a suspect class on their own.
Minority language classifications are national origin discrimination
because
[u]nlike facially neutral devices such as a minimum height requirement or a standardized test which may have a disparate
impact upon a protected class, Speak-English-Only rules impact
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 439, 439-447 (1985)), (2) there is prejudice based on inaccurate
stereotypes of the minority (Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)), (3) the class is defined by an
immutable trait (Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447), and (4) the group is politically powerless (Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982)).
150. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477 (1954) (Mexican-Americans are a suspect class);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Japanese-Americans are a suspect class).
151. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984).
152. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
153. Id.
154. Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996).
155. San Antonio Sch. Dist. Indep. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
156. See generally Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor Newer Equal Protection,86 HARv. L. REV. 1,
8 (1971); JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA. CONSTtIJONAL LAW § 14.3 at 583 (4th ed.
1990).
157. Hereinafter, the term "language classifications" will be used.
158. Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929
(1984); Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1975); Carmona v. Sheffield. 475 F.2d 738 (9th
Cir. 1973); Guadalupe OrganizationInc., 587 F.2d at 1022.
159. The Court has not done so under equal protection; however, the Court did review a language restriction under substantive due process analysis. See, Meyer, 262 U.S. 390. In Hernandez v.
New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369-72 (1991), the Court did state (in a plurality decision) that language
can be treated as a surrogate for race for purposes of equal protection.
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national origin minorities almost exclusively. Just as skin color
and surname often identify one's racial identity, one's primary
language and accent commonly identify national origin."
Several courts have already stated that language classifications are intimately
tied to national origin discrimination.' 6' The EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin and HEW's interpretation of Title VI equate
linguistic characteristics with national origin. In addition, statistics demonstrate the correlation between national origin and language. For example,
ninety-seven percent of individuals who speak Spanish are Hispanic. 62
Language classifications can also become a suspect class, independent of the tie to national origin, because persons who speak minority
languages are discrete and insular minorities. A minority is discrete and
insular when: (1) there has been a history of purposeful discrimination
against the minority, (2) there is prejudice based on inaccurate stereotypes
of the minority, (3) the class is defined by an immutable trait, and (4) the
group is politically powerless. 63 As discussed throughout this comment,
there has been a history of purposeful discrimination against language
minorities." 4 Second, the prejudice against language minorities is based
on inaccurate stereotypes. 65 Third, the class is defined by an immutable
trait which is their national origin." Finally, language minorities are

160.

Edward M. Chen, Garcia v. Spunsteak Co.: Speak-English-Only Rules and the Demise of

Workplace Pluralism, 1 ASIAN L.J. 155 (1994) (citing Perea, supra note 12, at 289-92).
161.

See Gutierrez, 838 F.2dat 1038, 1041; Garcia, 618 F.2d at267; Yniguez, 69F.3dat948;

Olagues v. Russoniello, 770 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1995); Odima v. West Tucson Hotel Co., 991 F.2d
595, 601 (9th Cir. 1993) ("accent and national origin are obviously inextricably intertwined");

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 370-72 (language can be treated as a surrogate for race).
162. Leonardo F. Estrada, The Ectent of Spanish/EnglishBilingualism in the United States, 15

AZTLAN INT'L J. CHICANO STUD. RES. 379, 381 (1984); see also STATISTICAL RECORD OF
ASIAN AMERICANS (Susan B. Gall & Timothy L. Gall eds., 1983).
163. See supra note 148.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 14-22. The new 'official English" movement seems to be
targeted specifically at Hispanics and Southeast Asians. Perea, supm note 17, at 343-44 ('The cause of the

official English movement is the immigration of people unpopular in the eyes of the majority.... Many
commentators agree that the cause of the official English is the large, and largely unwelcome, immigration
of many Hispanics and Southeast Asians during recent decades.")(citing Califa. supra note 30, at 297-99
(noting that the influx of Cubans, Mexicans and Southeast Asians after 1959 caused 'concern among inmigration restictionists')); Joshua A. Fishman, "English Only*: Its Ghosts, Myts, and Dangers, 74 INT'L J.
SOC. LANGUAGE 125, 133-34 (1988); David F. Marshall, The Question of an Oficiai Language:Language

Rights and the English Language Amendment, 60 INT'L J. SOC. LANGUAGE 7, 12-13 (1986)). The "official
English" movement is targeting specific national origin groups through their language-by their very acts they
ar equating a minority language with national origin.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 73, 76, 93-99 (discussing, among other things, the
prevalence of English and willingness and ability to learn English).
166. See supra text accompanying note 160 (statistical relationship between language and nation-

al origin).
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generally politically powerless, especially when governments do not mandate access through provisions like the Voting Rights Act. 6 7
While the Supreme Court may not equate language classifications
with national origin classifications or create a new suspect classification,
the Court has indicated that equal protection may still find strength in
rational basis review. In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court reviewed
the constitutionality of Colorado's Amendment 2, which "precluded all
legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of government designed to protect the status of persons based on 'homosexual, lesbian, or
bisexual orientation.'""' The Court struck down the Amendment on
rational basis review: "We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.""6 The Court noted that even in an "ordinary
equal protection case," the Court insists on a rational link between a
classification and a state objective. 70
Amendment 2 provides a powerful parallel to certain language restrictions. Amendment 2 was a negative right enactment (mandating that
sexual orientation cannot be protected) like some of the "official English"
enactments (minority language rights may not be protected; or rather,
only English will be protected). "Official English" legislation carves
minority language speakers out of equal protection of the laws. Stated
another way,
Although language minorities, unlike homosexuals, do not currently face legal discrimination, amendments to state constitutions
that declare English to be a state's official language place language minorities in the same legal position as homosexuals under
Amendment 2 .... None of the amendments expressly legalizes
discrimination on the basis of language, but the amendments
implicitly or explicitly recognize the legislature's right to implement English as the state's official language. The effect of these
amendments is to render language minorities powerless to attack
governmental actions that may harm their interests, as the government may justify its actions by asserting that it is using its constitutional mandate to make English the state's official language. 7'

167. See supra accompanying note 28-30.
168.

116 S.Ct. at 1623.

169. Id. at 1629.
170. Id. at 1627.
171. Daniel J. Garfield, Don't Box Me In: The Unconstitutionalityof Amendment 2 and English-

Onty Amendments, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 690, 691-92 (1995).
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As the Supreme Court stated in Romer, "[it is a status-based enactment
divorced from any factual context from which [a court] could discern 72a
relationship to legitimate state interests; it is a classification of persons
undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does
not permit. "173

To pass constitutional muster under the Romer analysis, the state or
federal government must show legitimate reasons to place languages in a
hierarchy. Particularly relevant to language rights, the Court stated:
Central to both the idea of the rule of law and to our own
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that
government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms
to all who seek its assistance. 'Equal protection of the law is not
achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.' . . . A

law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one
group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the law in the most
literal sense ....

[Liaws of the kind now before us raise the

inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected. '[I]f the constitutional perception of the laws' means anything, it must at the very
least mean that a bare

. . .

desire to harm a politically unpopular

group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.

4

There is every indication that the new "official English" legislation
stems from "an animosity towards the class of persons affected."" 5 The
next section examines this premise in terms of recent legislation.
C. The United States ConstitutionApplied to the New Movement
1. The Arizona Amendment
In 1988, Arizona voters passed Article XXVIII of the Arizona Constitution in a ballot initiative. 76 Yniguez, a bilingual Hispanic woman

172. "Official English" legislation is the classification of persons whose primary or native language is not English, as compared to those whose primary language is English.

173. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629. Emphasis added. Garfield's comment predates the Supreme
Court's decision in Romer but accurately predicted that the Supreme Court would not utilize strict
scrutiny but rather rational basis to strike down Amendment 2.
174. Id. at 1628.
175. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
176. See app. C. Article XXVIII prohibits any state official or employee from speaking or providing documents in any language other than English, with limited exceptions for education, for
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employed by the Department of Administration, handled medical malpractice claims against the state of Arizona.' Before Article XXVIII passed,
Yniguez communicated in Spanish to unilingual Spanish-speaking claimants, while also conversing in Spanish and English to bilingual claimants.' Article XXVIII Section 3 prohibits the "state from using or requiring the use of languages other than English." 79 State employees who
fail to obey the Arizona Constitution are sanctioned; therefore, Yniguez
ceased speaking Spanish after passage of Article XXVIII. 18°
Yniguez filed suit against the State of Arizona, among other defendants, claiming Article XXVIII violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as federal civil rights
laws.' 81 The United States District Court for the District of Arizona held
Article XXVIII unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment for
being facially overbroad."n Since Arizona Governor Mofford, who criticized the Article from its inception, decided not to appeal the district
court decision, Arizonans for Official English and the Arizona Attorney
General intervened post-judgment for the purpose of pursuing an appeal. '8 The district court denied the motions for intervention. The Ninth
Circuit reversed, but limited the Attorney General's motion to arguing the
constitutionality of Article XXVIII.2
Arizona's Article XXVIII is the most restrictive "official English" provision enacted to date. " The Ninth Circuit struck the amendment down on first amendment grounds, most notably overbreadth. '

protecting
177.
178.
179.

of criminal defendants or victims of crime, and to "protect public health or safety*.
rights
Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 924.
Id.
See app. C.

180. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at924.
181. Id. at 925.

182. Id.
183. Id. at 926.
184. Id.

and employees
plain language broadly prohibits allgovernment officials
185. "The article's
official
duties, save tothe extent that
from speaking languages other than English inperforming their
the use of non-English languages ispermitted pursuant tothe provision's narrow exceptions section. Id. at931.
186. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 931-38. In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit divided the First Amendment
v.negaissues into four categories: (1)overbreadth, (2)speech v.expressive conduct, (3)affirfmative
tive
rights,
and (4)public employee speech. "Under the overbreadth doctrine, an individual whose
be prohibited under a given provision ispermitted to challenge its
own speech may constitutionally

be
not before the court will
parties
that
thespeech of third
validity
because of the threat
facial
Id. (citing
Board of Airport Comm'rs v.Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569 (1987)). Inaddition,
chilled."
Id. at931. The Ninth Circuit noted thatArticle XXVII
and substantial.
the overbreadth must be real
could not be more inclusive of persons ingovernment service. Id. at932.
in discussing the overbreadth of Article
court decision was even more helpful
The district
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In its decision, the court noted that the government generally has more
latitude in regulating "expressive conduct" or "symbolic speech" when
"the regulation is not directed at the communicative nature of that
conduct." " The main arguments of the appellants, Arizonans for
Official English, were (1) that the amendment regulates expressive
conduct, not speech, and (2) the case law demonstrates that courts do
not recognize the language right of anyone whose primary language is
not English, most notably the right to state services in their native
language.188 The Ninth Circuit quickly discarded the argument that
choice of language is expressive conduct:
ITihe fact that such 'conduct' is shaped by a language-that is, a
sophisticated and complex system of understood meanings-is what
makes it speech. Language is by definition speech, and the regulation of any language is the regulation of speech .... A bilingual person does, of course, make an expressive choice by choosing to speak one language rather than another .... Nonetheless,
this expressive effect does not reduce choice of language to the
level of 'conduct'. 8 9
The court concluded that
[t]o call a prohibition that precludes the conveying of information
to thousands of Arizonans in a language they can comprehend a
mere regulation of 'mode of expression' is to miss entirely the
basic point of First Amendment protections.'9°

XXVII. Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990). In particular, the district court
noted that the amendment forbids any state employee from speaking any language other than English
except in a few limiting circumstances, with examples of which employees were so limited: (1) state
legislators speaking to his/her constituents, (2) state employees commenting on matters of public concern, and (3) judges performing wedding ceremonies. Id. at 314.
The Ninth Circuit addressed the two arguments presented by the appellants: (1) Article
XXVII interferes with expressive conduct, not pure speech, and (2) the state cannot be compelled to
provide information to all members of the public in a language that they can comprehend. Yniguez, 69
F.3d at 934.
187. Id.
188. See supra text accompanying note 161.
189. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 934-35 (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit held that this was similar
to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), when it
upheld the right to "say 'fuck the draft' rather than 'I strongly oppose the draft.' Like the proponents
of Article XXVIH, the state in Cohen had described Cohen's choice of language as conduct equivalent
to burning a draft card. The Court unequivocally rejected that comparison, stating that Cohen's conviction rested 'solely upon speech.'" Yniguez. 69 F.3d at 935.

190. Id. at 936.
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The Ninth Circuit also dismissed the relationship to the recent trend
of cases that do not recognize a right to state services in one's native
language. The court acknowledged that although, traditionally, "nonEnglish speakers have no affirmative right to compel state government to
provide information in a language that they can comprehend," 9' the
appellants were confusing negative with affirmative rights. The court held
that this case was not about requiring a state to provide information in a
language other than English, but rather a case where
the state cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, gag the
employees currently providing members of the public with information and thereby effectively preclude large numbers of persons
from receiving information that they have previously received.92
The Ninth Circuit also had to grapple with the distinction between
private speech and public employee speech. It seems clear that it would
be unconstitutional to prohibit the speaking of languages other than English for an entire state or country. 93 However, the Court also noted that
the Supreme Court "has made clear that it is the government's interest in
performing its functions efficiently and effectively that underlies its right
to exercise greater control over the speech of public employees."" The
greater control, however, is a limited doctrine.
The Supreme Court cases
also establish . . . that public employee speech deserves far greater protection when the employee is speaking not simply upon employment matters of personal or internal interest but instead 'as a
citizen upon matters of public concern.'... In such cases, the

191.

Id.

192. Id. at 936-37. Note the similarity between this analysis and that presented by the Romer
decision. Although Romer was in the context of equal protection, the premise is the same. A state
may not be affirmatively obligated to provide information or services in a language other than English, but a state cannot prevent employees, agencies, or others from doing so if they choose. The
affirmative rights v. negative rights doctrine find strength in both First Amendment and equal protec-

tion analysis.
193. See id. at 937 (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401). In an interesting twist on the subject, one
author stated that "although Article XXVIII restricts the government official or employee instead of
the citizen, the effect is identical. The inability to understand English would preclude citizens from
speaking to the elected representatives and to government bureaucrats, preventing the citizens from
obtaining government services to which they otherwise were entitled. Article XXVIII thus accomplishes indirectly that which Arizona cannot do directly, rendering it unconstitutional." Scott H.
Angstreich, Speaking in Tongues: Whose Rights at Stake? Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English,
19 HARv.

.L. & PUB. POL'Y 634, 642 (Winter 1996).

194. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 939.
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content of the speech requires that the government's concern with
efficiency and effectiveness be balanced against the public
employee's first amendment interest in speaking.'
The Court held that the balance tips in favor of the public employee's
interest in speaking in this case:
The employee speech banned by Article XXVIII is unquestionably
of public import. It pertains to the provision of governmental services and information. Unless that speech is delivered in a form
that the intended recipients can comprehend, they are likely to be
deprived of much needed data as well as of substantial public and
private benefits."

The Court emphasized the fact that efficiency and effectiveness are actually decreased with the amendment."9
The other state justifications for the law are: "protecting democracy
by encouraging 'unity and political stability'; encouraging a common
language; and protecting public confidence." 19 The court quickly dismissed these claims, as the state never presented "more than 'assertion
and conjecture to support its claim.'"'" The court found support from the
United States Supreme Court decisions in Meyer v. Nebraska,2' and
Farringtonv. Tokushige,2"
As in Meyer, the Tokushige Court recognized the validity of the
interests asserted in defense of the statute. Nonetheless, citing
Meyer's invalidation of the Nebraska law, it found that the
statute's promotion of these interests was insufficient to justify
infringing on the constitutionally protected right to educate one's
children to become proficient in one's mother tongue. .

.

. Al-

though there is probably no more effective way of encouraging

195. Id. (citations omitted).
196. Id. at 940. The Court listed circumstances where needed speech would be prohibited: residents cannot obtain information regarding state and local social services, state legislators cannot communicate with some of their constituents, residents cannot communicate with state or local housing
offices or clerks of court. Id. at 941-42. The reader should also note the relationship of this argument
to equal protection analysis in that the court must weigh the need for efficiency with the need for the
individual to have equal protection of the laws.
197. Id. at 942.

198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 944.
Id. at 945.
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
273 U.S. 284 (1927).
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the uniform use of English than to ensure that children grow up
speaking it, both statutes were struck down on the ground that
these interests were insufficient to warrant such restrictions on the
use of foreign languages.'m
Although the decision may indicate strong limits on employers'
ability to control their employees' speech, employees do not have an
absolute right to say anything they wish while at their jobs. 3 The focus
is on 4the audience and their interest in the content of the communication. 1
Despite the fact that the Ninth Circuit's decision addressed many
areas of the First Amendment which limit a government's ability to restrict its employees to speak English, providing a useful framework for
future cases, the decision did not stand. The United States Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit decision and ordered that the district court
decision be dismissed.' The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision
for mootness, holding that there was no case or controversy because
Yniguez had left her state job.' As a result of this action, the Court
passed on an opportunity to definitively present a constitutional framework for "official English" statutes.2]7
2. "Benign" Legislation
Legislation that simply declares English the official language could
not be challenged for constitutionality because no one would have standing to bring an action. The legislation itself does not do anything. Assuming there was standing, even this least restrictive legislation could be
struck down on equal protection grounds. If a court applied strict scrutiny

202. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 945-46 (citations omitted).
203. See Angstreich, supra note 193, at 640.
204. Id. (citing Waters v. Churchill, 114 S.Ct. 1878, 1886 (1994)).

205. Arizonans for Official English, 65 U.S.L.W. 4169.
206. Id. Yniguez attempted to preserve the case on appeal by requesting nominal damages; however, the Court held this was insufficient to save the case because it resembled a "friendly or feigned
proceeding" and the Ninth Circuit should have noticed that "a claim for nominal damages, extracted
late in the day from Yniguez's general prayer for relief and asserted solely to avoid otherwise certain
mootness, bore close inspection." Id. The Court refrained from deciding whether Arizonans for Official English and Robert D. Park had standing to intervene but did state that they "have grave doubts"

concerning their standing.
207. Although it is the duty of courts to avoid constitutional questions if possible, certain doctrines like overbreadth may allow courts to ignore procedural requirements, such as standing. See,
e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 235, 261264 (1994); Lisa A. Kloppenberg. Avoiding Serious ConstitutionalDoubts: The Supreme Court's Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 93 (1996).
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(by first determining that language classifications are suspect classifications), the state would have to: (1) present a compelling governmental
interest, and (2) demonstrate the law was narrowly tailored to meet the
interest. The compelling governmental interest in this legislation is most
likely national unity.2 This most would likely be struck down as not
being a compelling governmental interest for several reasons. As indicated
above, there is no historical basis for declaring English the primary language. In addition, the concern over social strife because of a lack of an
official language is likewise unproven.' Finally, there is no real threat to
the English language. In fact, it is now the true international language. 10
It seems apparent that governments would not be able to demonstrate that
"'
declaring English the official language is for a compelling state interest.21
If the court utilized a rational basis test like that utilized in Romer,
the law might pass constitutional muster. The state would have a lesser
burden, as they only need to show: (1) a legitimate governmental interest,
and (2) the law is rationally related to the governmental interest. The
Court stated in Romer that a law cannot be a "status-based enactment
divorced from any factual context."22 Again, the debate would focus on
whether the court believed that there was a real threat to the English
language and that the best way to achieve national unity was with such a
law.
This example demonstrates the need for courts to utilize an equal
protection analysis, in addition to a First Amendment inquiry, because the
equal protection analysis focuses more on the motivations behind the law
and can restrict the constitutionality of such laws even when they would
pass First Amendment analysis.
3. Wyoming
The Wyoming "official English" statute would most likely pass First
Amendment analysis. The law allows for an education exception as well
as an exception for information or services provided orally in a language
other than English. A court is not likely to find that every citizen is enti-

208. Economics, social, and political participation do not seem to be related to this legislation
because it provides no restrictions, no mandates, no specific purpose other than to state English is the
official language.

209. The examples from Canada are simply not dispositive. As discussed earlier, the conflict is
usually about something other than language.
210. Perea, supra note 17, at 347.
211. A court would most likely find the statute narrowly tailored but would still strike the law
down because there is no compelling state interest.

212. 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
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tied to written and oral communication in any form with its government
in his/her native tongue. The law does not seem to be overbroad because
there is likely no chilling effect if the act is given liberal interpretation
and provides for no real restrictions. On the face of the statute, there does
not seem to be a violation.
The law, however, most likely would be struck down on equal
protection grounds. Again, as indicated above, Wyoming would have a
very difficult time arguing that there is a compelling interest in limiting
all government communications, with the exception of oral communications, to English. Proponents of the law argue that it is justified by the
interests in national unity, economics, and greater political and social
participation. As indicated above, national unity would probably never be
considered a compelling governmental interest. The economic argument
fails as well because there is no evidence on costs (whether saved or lost).
Additionally, if the government allows for oral communication in another
language, it is difficult to fathom how providing an interpreter is less
costly than keeping documents on file in another language.
. Greater political and social participation are probably considered
compelling government interests; however, the manner in which the law
attempts to achieve this fails. The law is not narrowly tailored because it
mandates policies that just do not work. If an immigrant cannot receive
basic or necessary information in order to become a productive member
of society, the law is exclusionary rather than inclusionary. As discussed
earlier, the best way to help immigrants learn English is to teach them
and assist them in their native tongue - not exclude them as a manner of
coercing them to learn English.
Under a Romer style equal protection analysis, there is likely a
legitimate governmental interest in increasing political and social participation, as well as efficiency and national unity. However, the law may
not be rationally related to these interests for many of the same reasons
indicated above. There is little, if any, evidence to support the idea that
laws that force individuals to learn English before participating in society
actually work. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. Wyoming's law is
not very restrictive, however, in that it allows governmental transactions
in another language if the official so desires. In all likelihood, Wyoming's
law would pass Romer equal protection analysis but fail strict scrutiny.
4. Federal "Official English" Proposals
The federal government will face the same uphill battles presented
above in demonstrating a compelling governmental interest. In addition,
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the ELEA and similar proposals are much more restrictive than
Wyoming's provisions because they prohibit communication in other
languages, with few exceptions. Because of these prohibitions, the ELEA
and similar proposals are likely to fail a Romer analysis because they do
exactly what Colorado's Amendment 2 did: they single out classifications
from protection of the laws2" 3 rather than limiting what the government is
obligated to do.
Furthermore, the First Amendment would present an obstacle. The
ELEA and similar proposals allow only oral communication between
legislatures and constituents-severely chilling protected speech.2 4 The
proposals are clearly overbroad, in much the same manner as the Arizona
Amendment, because they apply to all branches of government in their
official business (including governmental actions, documents, policies,
informational
material, any other publications, as well as judicial pro21 5
ceedings).
These examples of First and Fourteenth Amendment analysis of
English-only laws demonstrate how important it is for the courts to create
a consistent constitutional framework. First, courts must utilize the Fourteenth Amendment in addition to the First Amendment when analyzing
"official English" statutes because each Amendment tests different issues.
Additionally, it is the duty of the courts to temper a political movement
so that it does not violate individual rights. The judiciary's role in the
"official English" movement is truly that of a counter majoritarian forcerestricting the movement before it eliminates all minority language rights.
CONCLUSION

The "official English" movement classifies language minorities "not
to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone
else." 2" 6 The recent actions to erode federal statutory protection of minori213. The bill states that services or information may not be provided in another language, as
opposed the Wyoming statute which just prevents an affirmative obligation to do so.
214. Fiscal efficiency, which has never been a sufficient justification for limiting protected
speech, is the justification for allowing for oral communications.
215. At this point it is also helpful to note the far-reaching impacts of this legislation in terms of
repealing the Voting Rights Act, and Tides VI and Titles VII. "Discrimination in voting will reemerge," because it denies the right to vote to those without English as their primary language.
Perea, supra, note 17, at 366-67. It would exclude "politically vulnerable groups identified by language and national origin," as well as encouraging employers to prohibit use of other languages. Id.
In effect, non-English-speaking persons would be eliminated form the government, voting and the
workplace. A court simply could not find that such a law is narrowly tailored nor meets a compelling
or legitimate state interest.
216. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
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ty language rights could have been tempered by the United States Supreme Court in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona. By dismissing
the opportunity to decide Arizonans for Official English on substantive
grounds, the Supreme Court left the door open for the "official English"
movement-a movement justified by nothing less than nativism and prejudice-to eliminate the ground won by the civil rights legislation in the
1960's and 1970's.

LoRi A. MCMULLEN
CHARLENE
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APPENDIX A: The English Language
Empowerment Act of 1996
§ 161. Declaration of official language of Federal Government
The official Language of the Federal Government is English
§ 162. Preserving and enhancing the role of the official language
Representatives of the Federal Government shall have an affirmative
obligation to preserve and enhance the role of English as the official language
of the Federal Government. Such obligation shall include encouraging greater
opportunities for individuals to learn the English language.
§ 163. Official Federal Government activities in English
(a) Conduct of Business. Representatives of the Federal Government
shall conduct official business in English.
(b) Denial of Services. No person shall be denied services, assistance, or facilities, directly or indirectly provided by the Federal
Government solely because the person communicates in English.
(c) Entitlement. Every person in the United States is entitled: (1) to
communicate with representatives of the Federal Government in
English. (2) to receive information from or contribute information to
the Federal Government in English; and (3) be informed or be subject to official orders in English.
§ 164. Standing
A person injured by a violation of this chapter may in a civil action
obtain appropriate relief.
§165. Reform of naturalization requirements
(a) Fluency. It has been the longstanding national belief that full
citizenship in the United States requires fluency in English. English
is the language of opportunity for all immigrants to take their rightful place in society in the United States.
(b) Ceremonies. All authorized official shall conduct all naturalization ceremonies entirely in English.
§ 166. Application
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the provisions of this
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chapter shall supersede any existing Federal law that contravenes such
provision (such as requiring the use of a language other than English for
official business of the Federal Government).
§167. Rule of Construction
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed: (1) to prohibit a Member of
Congress or an employee or official of the Federal Government, while performing official business, from communicating orally with another person in
a language other than English; (2) to discriminate against or restrict the rights
of any individual in the country; and (3) to discourage or prevent the use of
languages other than English in an nonofficial capacity.
§168. Affirmation of constitutional protections
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to be inconsistent with he
Constitution of the United States.
§ 169. Definitions
For purposes of this chapter: (1) Federal Government. The term Federal
Government means all branches of the national Government and all employees and officials of the national Government while performing official business. (2) Official business. The term official business means governmental
actions, documents, or policies which are enforceable with the full weight and
authority to the Federal Government, and includes publications, income tax
forms, and informational material, but does not include:
(A) teaching of languages;
(B) actions, documents, or policies necessary for
(i) national security issues; or
(ii) international relations, trade, or commerce;
(C)actions or documents that protect the public health or safety;
(D) actions or documents that facilitate the activities of the Census;
(E) actions, documents, or policies that are not enforceable in the
United States;
(F) actions that protect the rights of victims of crimes or criminal
defendants;
(G) actions in which the United States has initiated a civil lawsuit; or
(H) documents that utilize terms of art or phrases from languages
other than English.
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APPENDIX B: Wyoming Official-English
Statute
§ 8-6-101. English as official language of Wyoming.
(a) English shall be designated as the official language of Wyoming.
Except as otherwise provided by law, no state agency or political
subdivision of the state shall be required to provide any documents,
information, literature or other written materials in any language
other than English.
(b) A state agency or political subdivision or its officers or employees may act in a language other than the English language for any of
the following purposes:
(i) to provide information orally to individuals in the course of
delivering services to the general public;
(ii) to comply with federal law;
(iii) to protect the public health or safety;
(iv) to protect the rights of parties and witnesses in a civil or
criminal action in a court or in an administrative proceeding:
(v) to provide instruction in foreign and Native American
language courses;
(vi) to provide instruction designed to aid students with limited
English proficiency so they can make a timely transition to use
of the English language in the public schools;
(vii) to promote international commerce, trade or tourism;
(viii) to use terms of art or phrases from languages other than
the English language in documents.
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APPENDIX C: Arizona Constitution Article
XXVIII
§1 English as the official language; applicability
(1) The English language is the official language of the State of Arizona.
(2) As the official language of this State, the English language is the
language of the ballot, the public schools and all government functions and actions.
(3) (a) This Article applies to:
(i) the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government,
(ii) all political subdivisions, departments, agencies, organizations, and instrumentalities of this State, including local
governments and municipalities,
(iii) all statutes, ordinances, rules, orders, programs and
policies,
(iv) all governmental officials and employees during the
performance of government business.
(b) As used in this Article, the phrase "This State and all political subdivisions of this State" shall include every entity, person,
action or item described in this Section, as appropriate to the
circumstances.
§ 2. Requiring this state to preserve, protect and enhance English
§ 2(2). This State and all political subdivisions of this State shall
take all reasonable steps to preserve, protect and enhance the role of
the English language as the official language of the State of Arizona.
§ 3. Prohibiting this state from using or requiring the use of languages
other than English; exceptions
§ 3.(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2):
(a) This State and all political subdivisions of this State shall not
act in English and in not other language.
(b) No entity to which this Article applies shall make or enforce
a law, order, decree or policy which requires the use of a language other than English.
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(c) No governmental document shall be valid, effective or enforceable unless it is in the English language.
§3.(2) This State and all political subdivisions of this State may act
in a language other than English under any of the following circumstances:
(a) to assist students who are not proficient in the English language, to the extent necessary to comply with federal law, by
giving educational instruction in a language other than English
to provide as rapid as possible a transition toEnglish,
(b) to comply with other federal laws,
(c) to teach a student a foreign language as a part of a required
or voluntary educational curriculum,
(d) to protect public health or safety,
(e) to protect the rights of criminal defendants or victims of
crime.
§4. Enforcement: standing.
A person who resided in or does business in this State shall have
standing to bring suit to enforce this Article in a court of record of
the State. The Legislature may enact reasonable limitations on the
time and manner of bringing suit under this subsection.
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